Dimaandal V. Coa Case Digest

CMM DIGEST Dimaandal v. COA June 16, 1998 G.R. No. 122197 (The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws) Petitioner: Dimaandal Respondent: COA Ponente: Martinez FACTS:  Dimaandal  Held position as Supply Officer III in Batangas  Designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer by Batangas Governor Mayo in 1993.  Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in salary and Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) for the whole year of 1993.  Provincial Auditor disallowed the claim.  On appeal to COA, COA also disallowed the claim. Ratio: (1) Dimaandal was merely designated, thus he was not e ntitled to receive additional salary. (2) The governor was not the “duly competent authority” who can designate him to such position under Sec 471 of LGC (note: in 1994 he was eventually appointed by Sec of Finance). ISSUE: WON an Dimaandal is entitled to the difference between the regular position and higher position to which he was designated. HELD: NO. RATIO:  Arguments of Dimaandal:  Jurisprudence laid down the rule that de facto officers are entitled to salary for services actually rendered. (1) Defective Designation  Law provides: Assistant Treasurers. - (a) An assistant treasurer may be appointed appointed by  LGC Section 471: Assistant the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.  Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code: In case of the temporary absence or disability of a provincial officer or in case of a vacancy in a provincial office, the President of the Philippines or officer having the power to fill such position may, in his discretion, order the payment of compensation, or additional compensation, to any Government officer or employee designated or appointed temporarily to fill the place, but the total compensation paid shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled .  Law does not authorize Provincial Governor to appoint, nor even designate one temporarily in cases of temporary absence/disability/vacancy in a provincial office. Power resides with President or Sec of Finance.  Dimaandal’s  designation is defective. Thus, it confers no right. No ground for violation of constitutional right, nor impairment of the obligation of contracts. CMM DIGEST Dimaandal v. COA June 16, 1998 G.R. No. 122197 (The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws) (2) Mere designation, not appointment.  Difference between designation and appointment:   Appointment : selection by the proper the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office  Designation: merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment; simply the mere imposition of new or additional duties on the officer or employee to be performed by him in a special manner; it does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. As such, there being no appointment issued, designation does not entitle the officer designated to receive the salary of the position. For the legal basis of an employee’s right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position. (3) He cannot be considered a de facto officer. : one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to  De Facto Officer  appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face; one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer; one who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though such election or appointment may be irregular.  Precedents are inapplicable. In Menzon, what was extended was an appointment to  Menzon v. Petilla: the vacant position of Vice-Governor, in petitioner’s case, he was designated.   The appointment of Menzon had the color of validity.  Cui v. Ortiz: “Petitioners’ appointments on December 1 and 12, 1955 by  the then mayor of the municipality were legal and in order, the appointing mayor still in possession of his right to appoint. For such appointments to be complete, the approval of the President of the Philippines is required. The law provides that pending approval of said appointment by the President, the appointee may assume office and receive salary for services actually rendered. Accordingly, therefore, in that duration until the appointment is finally acted upon favorably or unfavorably, the appointees may be considered as ‘de facto’ officers and entitled to salaries for services actually rendered.”  Lastly, the 1999 appointment by Sec of Finance does not confirm the claim of petitioner that his appointment is retroactive. JUDGMENT :
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CMM DIGEST

Dimaandal v. COA
June 16, 1998
G.R. No. 122197
(The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws)


Petitioner: Dimaandal
Respondent: COA
Ponente: Martinez

FACTS:
 Dimaandal
 Held position as Supply Officer III in Batangas
 Designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer by Batangas Governor Mayo in 1993.
 Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in salary and Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) for the whole year of 1993.
 Provincial Auditor disallowed the claim.
 On appeal to COA, COA also disallowed the claim. Ratio:
(1) Dimaandal was merely designated, thus he was not entitled to receive additional salary.
(2) The governor was not the “duly competent authority” who can designate him to such
position under Sec 471 of LGC (note: in 1994 he was eventually appointed by Sec of
Finance).

ISSUE: WON an Dimaandal is entitled to the difference between the regular position and higher
position to which he was designated.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
 Arguments of Dimaandal:
 Jurisprudence laid down the rule that de facto officers are entitled to salary for services
actually rendered.

(1) Defective Designation
 Law provides:
 LGC Section 471: Assistant Treasurers. - (a) An assistant treasurer may be appointed by
the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible recommendees
of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
 Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code: In case of the temporary absence or
disability of a provincial officer or in case of a vacancy in a provincial office, the
President of the Philippines or officer having the power to fill such position may, in his
discretion, order the payment of compensation, or additional compensation, to any
Government officer or employee designated or appointed temporarily to fill the place,
but the total compensation paid shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
position filled.
 Law does not authorize Provincial Governor to appoint, nor even designate one temporarily
in cases of temporary absence/disability/vacancy in a provincial office. Power resides with
President or Sec of Finance.
 Dimaandal’s designation is defective. Thus, it confers no right. No ground for violation of
constitutional right, nor impairment of the obligation of contracts.

CMM DIGEST
Dimaandal v. COA
June 16, 1998
G.R. No. 122197
(The Law on Public Officers, Civil Service Laws, Election Laws)

(2) Mere designation, not appointment.
 Difference between designation and appointment:
 Appointment: selection by the proper the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office
 Designation: merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment; simply the mere
imposition of new or additional duties on the officer or employee to be performed by
him in a special manner; it does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon
the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. As such,
there being no appointment issued, designation does not entitle the officer designated
to receive the salary of the position. For the legal basis of an employee’s right to claim
the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position.

(3) He cannot be considered a de facto officer.
 De Facto Officer: one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face; one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by
which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so
that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer; one who is in possession of an office in the
open exercise of its functions under color of an election or an appointment, even though
such election or appointment may be irregular.
 Precedents are inapplicable.
 Menzon v. Petilla: In Menzon, what was extended was an appointment to
the vacant position of Vice-Governor, in petitioner’s case, he was designated. The
appointment of Menzon had the color of validity.
 Cui v. Ortiz: “Petitioners’ appointments on December 1 and 12, 1955 by the then mayor
of the municipality were legal and in order, the appointing mayor still in possession of
his right to appoint. For such appointments to be complete, the approval of the
President of the Philippines is required. The law provides that pending approval of said
appointment by the President, the appointee may assume office and receive salary for
services actually rendered. Accordingly, therefore, in that duration until the
appointment is finally acted upon favorably or unfavorably, the appointees may be
considered as ‘de facto’ officers and entitled to salaries for services actually rendered.”

 Lastly, the 1999 appointment by Sec of Finance does not confirm the claim of petitioner that
his appointment is retroactive.

JUDGMENT: